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Abstract
This article investigates and integrates the concepts of alliance competition and inter-
alliance rivalry. While past research has focused primarily on intra-alliance dynamics such as
why, when, and with whom alliances are formed, the outcome of such agreements is unclear.
This paper focuses on inter-alliance dynamics that involve conceptualizing group-versus-
group or alliance competition and inter-alliance rivalry by studying the competitive
engagements of ﬁrms through alliances. We develop a model that includes a set of market
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables that can explain alliance competitive engagement.
r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The rapid proliferation of alliances has ushered in not only new era of cooperation
among companies big and small but also a new era of competition between alliances.
Cooperative agreements have become an integral part and cornerstone of
competitive strategies. ‘‘Competition through cooperation’’ has become the
mainstay of a ﬁrm’s attempt to gain ﬁnancial and survival advantages. The virtual
*Corresponding author. Tel.:+1-662-915-7530; fax:+1-662-915-7968.
E-mail addresses: rguidice@bus.olemiss.edu (R.M. Guidice), ash@commerce.net (A. Vasudevan),
g.m.duysters@tm.tue.nl (G. Duysters).
0956-5221/03/$-see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII:S095 6- 5221(02)00033-7explosion of cooperative agreements on a worldwide basis has led to a new form of
competition:group versus group rather than company versus company ( Gomes-
Casseres, 1994).
That collaborative rent-seeking behavior (Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997) has
become a competitive necessity is no longer disputed. But that collaborative rent-
seeking behavior has competitive implications, in that ﬁrms adopt collaborative
arrangements for similar competitive gains such as increased market share, improved
cost structures, or enhanced capabilities, remains largely unexplored. It is now
commonplace to see one group of ﬁrms in an alliance competing with another group
of ﬁrms in another alliance. Consider the following examples:MCI Communications
Corporation formed a joint venture with British Telecommunications (BT) in
response to AT&T’s expansion of long-distance service into the international market
through alliances. Also, when MCI formed an alliance with the Mexican company
Grupo Financiero Banamex, ﬁrms such as AT&T and Sprint responded in kind by
forming their own partnerships. Speciﬁcally, AT&T formed an alliance with Grupo
Alpha and Sprint formed an alliance with Texmex. The deregulation of the
telecommunication industry has also led to an expansion in the interactive
telecommunications media market. For example, Creative Artists Agency and Bell
Atlantic Corporation formed an alliance, as did Nynex Corporation and Paciﬁc
Telesis Group. In response, Bell South, Ameritech, SBC Communications, and
Disney formed a joint venture to develop, market, and deliver video programming to
customers. Finally, the announcement of the Star Alliance (United, Lufthansa,
Scandinavian Airlines, Air Canada, and Thai Airways) sent nonmembers scurrying
for partners (Air France with Air India and American Airlines with the Aerolineas
Argentinas).
These examples demonstrate that an action (i.e., alliance formation) does induce a
reaction (i.e., alliance formation response) under certain competitive conditions. This
new form of alliance-based competition and inter-alliance rivalry has unfortunately
received scant attention in the literature on competitive analysis and strategic
alliances. In view of this, the goal of this paper is to develop a model of alliance-
based competition that identiﬁes what it is about an alliance formation that elicits or
averts an alliance competitive response. In other words, we seek to identify speciﬁc
antecedent conditions that serve as necessary and sufﬁcient factors for the onset of
an alliance-competitive battle (i.e., an alliance action that elicits an alliance
response).
In general terms, the importance of exploring the integration of competitive
analysis and the prediction of rivalrous behavior is that it gets to the heart of what
makes an alliance effective from a competitive perspective. Understanding alliance-
based competition and inter-alliance rivalry is necessary because of the potential for
achieving synergies of scholarship from the dynamic interplay between the concepts
of competition and cooperation. From a managerial perspective it is important to
recognize that focusing exclusively on intra-alliance dynamics (i.e., trust, depen-
dence, governance, structuring, and management) offers only a partial slice of reality
in the use of alliances to build a competitive advantage (Lado et al., 1997). It is
equally important to recognize that an alliance is more likely to be competing against
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a thorough understanding not only of the internal alliance process but also of the
external competitive implications of alliances. Finally, it is crucial to acknowledge
the growing difﬁculty associated with initiating actions independently (the focus of
competitive analysis) and the rapid growth of cooperative agreements among ﬁrms
for pre-competitive and post-competitive purposes. For instance, research has shown
an increasing use of alliances for innovation (Hagedoorn, 1993; Powell, Koput, &
Smith Doerr, 1996), market penetration (Contractor & Lorange, 1988), speed of
entry (Kotabe, Sahay, & Aulakh, 1996), and knowledge acquisition (Kogut, 1988;
Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991).
We ground our arguments in the emergent process perspective (e.g., Chaffee, 1985;
Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), which maintains that the environment
is dynamic and uncertain. Because of this, strategies can and do change to ﬁt
situations as they unfold over time. This perspective also argues that while a ﬁrm
desires to be the master of its own destiny, there are many uncontrollable factors that
must be considered and that will inﬂuence strategic choices. Hence, from the
standpoint of this article, the conditions that validated the use of ‘‘going it alone’’
change, making it necessary to collaborate with others in order to regain an element
of control as well as to remain competitively viable. While an alliance strategy may
not have been initially planned by a ﬁrm, the enaction of an alliance by a direct
competitor changes the competitive landscape, forces the ﬁrm to critically evaluate
itself and its rivals and, under certain conditions, makes an alliance formation
response necessary. What emerges from this alliance response is a new form of
competition—group versus group.
Before presenting the assumptions underlying our framework, we would like to
offer a prefatory deﬁnition of alliances, alliance competition, and inter-alliance
rivalry. Alliances include any contractual partnership established with a view to
exchanging or combining the resources and skills of two or more ﬁrms to develop,
manufacture, or distribute goods or services (Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993). Alliances
can be unidirectional or bi-directional (Guliati, 1995), vertical or horizontal. They
can take the form of licensing agreements, technology transfers and exchanges,
R&D, manufacturing, and marketing arrangements, or joint ventures.
Alliance-competition is deﬁned as groups of alliances operating in similar markets,
offering competing products and services, and targeting similar customers (Chen,
1996) while vying for a limited pool of resources (Baum & Korn, 1996, p. 255). In
other words, competition is a process that occurs when an alliance formation has
competitive implications for members of an industry or market.
Inter-alliance rivalry is deﬁned as the degree of external competitive tension
between individual alliances that precipitates rivalrous rent-seeking exchange
behaviors (i.e., alliance actions and responses) to gain a competitive advantage
(Chen, 1996; Chen, Smith & Grimm, 1992). Stated otherwise, alliance rivalry exists
when competitors consider the actions and characteristics of each other in business
decisions as they strive for potentially incompatible positions (Baum & Korn, 1996).
Given these deﬁnitions, the focus of this research is on ﬁrms’ execution of within-
market, cross-market, and cross-border competitive moves and counter-moves
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(e.g., ﬁrm, group, or industry), a pair-wise action/response level of analysis is
necessary and appropriate because ‘‘it is at this level that actual competitive
engagement occurs, in which competitors enact their strategies, test their opponents’
mettle and capabilities, deﬁne their reputations, and signal their toughness, via their
response or lack of responses’’ (Chen & MacMillan, 1992, p. 541). Further, this pair-
wise focus is important if we are to integrate competitor analysis and inter-alliance
rivalry, as well as investigate and understand how and why speciﬁc competitive
conditions emerge and lead to alliance formation responses (i.e., competitive
dynamics).
2. Assumptions and scope of the study
Several assumptions limit the scope of this paper. In order to derive a means of
exploring the competitive dynamics of cooperative ventures, we view alliances as
competitive actions initiated by ﬁrms to secure a short-term or long-term competitive
edge. While numerous motivations exist to explain why alliances are formed—such
as to improve efﬁciency, gain access to foreign markets, or learn from partners
(Kogut, 1988)—the means are geared toward the end objective of competitive
superiority. However, a discussion of the full range of relationships between the focal
ﬁrm and its various stakeholders, such as relationships subsumed under other
relationships (as informed by network theory), exceeds the scope of this article.
We also assume that an initial business condition causes two or more
organizations to explore the possibility of forming a cooperative alliance.
Furthermore, this paper focuses only on for-proﬁt strategic alliances. The study
excludes nonproﬁt organizations because their motive for forming alliances often has
more to do with enhancing the quality of their services than with combating
competitive rivalry.
Throughout the paper we explore the competitive dynamics between ﬁrm A, which
has formed an alliance, and ﬁrm B, which has the potential to form an alliance, as
well as assume that ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B do not form an alliance with each other. While
this condition does not necessarily concur with reality (competitors cooperate in
certain areas and compete in others), we believe that it is acceptably sufﬁcient and
does not impede our central purpose of developing arguments about the dynamic
interplay between an alliance action and an alliance response. Finally, we assume
competition is an objective phenomenon largely inﬂuenced by the rational behavior
of ﬁrms aware of, and interested in, initiating and responding to alliance formations.
That is, the focus is on intended alliances, those resulting from the purposive actions
of ﬁrms (Kogut, 1991) that can be either reactive to a variation induced by an action
within an environment, or proactive, forestalling unpredictable behavior by other
organizations (Bresser & Harl, 1986).
Given that there is competitive asymmetry, we offer a number of propositions that
use cooperation and competition within shared markets to predict competitive
responses. In this paper we consider actions (alliance formations) and responses
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behavior among ﬁrms. For instance, if company A forms an R&D alliance with
company C, company B has two options:collaborate with company D for R&D
purposes or continue competing independently. However, to maintain the focus on
inter-alliance rivalry we consider only those responses that are likely to involve some
form of cooperation.
3. Background literature
Research on alliances has made signiﬁcant progress in exploring the question of
why and when alliances are formed (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Powell & Brantly, 1992).
More recently, research has advanced our understanding of ‘‘with whom’’ ﬁrms are
likely to form alliances (Gulati, 1995). Finally, while research investigating alliance-
based competition has focused largely on the moves and counter-moves from the
perspective of a single focal ﬁrm, research on alliance dynamics has focused more on
intra-alliance dynamics, including the performance/ﬁnancial beneﬁts of alliance
formation as well as issues of trust, opportunism, partner rivalry, governance,
structuring, and management (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1993; Hill, 1990).
In examining the relationship between competition and cooperation, research
(with the exception of the strategic behavior approach) has thus, drawn attention
primarily to the internal characteristics of the alliance, arguing that it is important to
acknowledge the mixed motive nature of alliances and its implications for
dependence, trust, and mutual beneﬁt (Singh & Mitchell, 1996). Although this
approach has served to considerably advance our understanding of the internal
process of alliance dynamics, it does less to improve our current understanding of the
external competitive implications of alliance relationships. That is, despite its
insightful focus on the alliance, this line of research has been primarily introspective
and has not yet begun to incorporate in its research domain the external competitive
environment in which the alliance competes.
Our goal is to extend this research and examine the external competitive
implications of alliance formation in the hope of building a bridge between
competition and cooperation. We draw insights from the rich literature on
competitive interaction, which includes the work by Chen et al. (1992), Chen and
Hambrick (1995), Chen and MacMillan (1992), to develop an integrative framework
of mechanisms that drive the intensity of alliance rivalry; one that involves a series of
moves and countermoves initiated through alliances to improve competitive
positions. To this end, this article seeks to answer a number of fundamental
questions. If ﬁrm A forms an alliance, what are the external implications? Given that
there is a quid pro quo relationship, what are the conditions that inﬂuence the
likelihood of an alliance response by ﬁrm B? For what reasons and under what
conditions does alliance rivalry between a group of ﬁrms arise? An understanding of
such antecedent considerations is vital if cooperative agreements are to be sustained
or not destroyed by competitive countermoves. Further, this analysis should aid in
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gain a competitive position within its industry.
We advance formal propositions through an investigation of distinct market and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that are likely to inﬂuence alliance competition and inter-
alliance rivalry (see Fig. 1). Based on an assessment of these attributes, certain
conditions lead the focal ﬁrm to modify its strategic behavior by forming an alliance
of its own. Ultimately, this process of attack and counterattack has performance




Past research has documented the role of speciﬁc industry and market
characteristics in shaping the frequency and pattern of inter-ﬁrm alliance agreements
(Auster, 1992; Hagedoorn, 1993; Harrigan, 1988; Porter & Fuller, 1986). In the
ensuing discussion we examine the impact that the following variables—based on a
general consensus among past research—have on the relationship between the
operating environment and inter-ﬁrm alliance formation:competitive uncertainty,
the number of value-generating partners, technological intensity, market concentra-
tion, industry life cycle, and competitive interconnectedness in shaping alliance-
based competition.
Competitive uncertainty. Competitive uncertainty stems from the interdependence
or interconnectedness existing between competitors (Burgers et al., 1993; Chen,
1996) and reﬂects the extent to which the fates of competing ﬁrms are tied to each
other. In other words, competitive uncertainty results from a ﬁrm’s inability to
predict the effect of a competitor’s strategic move (i.e., alliance formation) on the
ﬁrm’s market position, anticipated returns, or access to raw materials and
Market Context-Competitor Analysis
• Competitive uncertainty
• Number of value-generating
partners 
• Technological intensity




•  Likelihood of attack 
• Likelihood of response
Effect of Rivalrous 
Behavior on Performance 
Moderating Variables
• Collaborative Know-how 
• Firm size
• Firm strategy
Fig. 1. An Integrated Framework of Alliance Competitive Analysis and Inter-Alliance Rivalry.
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factors should inﬂuence the likelihood of a response from rivals (Chen, 1996).
In the context of blurring industry boundaries and the rising incidence of inter-
industry competitors, research has documented the emergence of inter-industry
competitive uncertainty (Dussauge, Hart, & Ramanantsoa, 1992; Kotabe et al.,
1996). It has been argued that because the attacking ﬁrm cannot predict whether
there will be a response or what the response will be, it enters into an alliance to
reduce the number of competitors (e.g., Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988)
as well as to respond proactively to uncertainty (Kogut, 1991).
1 Bresser and Harl
(2986, p. 411) argue that collective strategies serve to minimize decision making
uncertainty because the ‘‘couplings provided by market mechanisms (which link the
fates of business ﬁrms) have been weakened for a subset of organizations which now
cooperate’’. Based on the above discussion we propose the following argument:
P1. The greater the competitive uncertainty, the greater the likelihood that ﬁrm B
will form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance formation.
Number of value-generating partners. It is widely acknowledged that scarce
resources play a signiﬁcant role in shaping and inﬂuencing competition in the market
(Chen, 1996; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Porter, 1986; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).
Problems occur when resources are scarce or widely dispersed and when survival
depends upon the frequent occurrence of complementary resource exchanges
between ﬁrms. The ability to extract maximum rent from resource exchanges is
often conditioned by a ﬁrm’s ability to ﬁnd a partner with complementary resources
and relational compatibility (Dyer & Singh, 1998). As the rate of alliance formation
accelerates, the number of available ﬁrms will decrease, other things being equal.
If the incentive is to ﬁnd the right partner and if many partner ﬁrms are available
(within the industry, among suppliers or distributors, or in related industries) then a
ﬁrm will have limited incentive to rush into an alliance. Yet research suggests that a
company that initiates an alliance action early on clearly has an advantage over
potential respondents. First movers are able to capitalize on the most desirable
partners from the available, yet scarce, pool of members (Gomes-Casseres, 1996;
Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). Moreover, a smaller number of value-generating
partners available in the market may cause fewer in-kind responses to be elicited
from competitors.
2 However, scholars also state that while ﬁrms that enter the
alliance race ﬁrst have the largest number of ﬁrms from which to choose partners,
they have also been observed to form alliances at short notice and with minimal
planning (Gomes-Casseres, 1994), often in conditions of market and technological
uncertainty. Negative results often include lock-in effects such as inﬂexibility, low
organizational adaptability, and increased impact of endogenous disturbances
1See The Alliance Advantage: The Art of Creating Value for Partnering (Doz & Hamel, 1998) for a
description of such alliance races.
2Doz and Hamel (1998) argue that getting the ‘‘ﬁrst-order challenge’’ (combining specialized
technologies) and the ‘‘second-order change’’ (integrating complex technologies into new product/
services) right the ﬁrst time enables the ﬁrst mover to greatly reduce the number of second-order solutions
in competing for the future. This in turn requires forging partnerships with the right value-generating
partners.
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beneﬁts.
In contrast, if potential partners were scarce, a ﬁrm would have little incentive to
wait and see the impact of its competitor’s choice of partner(s). Late-comers face the
tangible risk of not being able to ﬁnd compatible partners with complementary
resources to create rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In other words, scarcity of partners
raises barriers to response by foreclosing on any additional opportunities to create
value by sharing knowledge, risk, technology, and so forth. Thus, the ﬁrm will
respond quickly in an attempt to offset a competitor’s advantage and, perhaps, gain
a new strategic advantage.
P2. The smaller the number of value-generating partners available in the market,
the greater the likelihood that ﬁrm B will form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s
alliance formation.
Technological intensity. The current climate of industry convergence and blurring
industry boundaries has been partially attributed to the substantial value-addition in
products early in the value chain as well as to the ﬂow of technology among
industries and the increased rate of technological change (Kotabe et al., 1996). In
fact, Auster maintains that ‘‘rapid technological change has created complex
products with shorter product life cycles, making competitive positioning difﬁcult to
achieve or sustain’’ (1987, p. 4). Statements such as these suggest that technological
intensity has not only increased the asymmetries between a ﬁrm’s knowledge domain
and product domain but also provided an incentive for ﬁrms to form alliances
(Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995).
Indeed, past research has widely documented the use of alliances to gain access to
technology-related competencies and resources as well as to mitigate the risk and
costs of commercializing complex, untested, technologically intensive products
(Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Doz & Hamel, 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993; Singh, 1995).
A consensus among researchers evaluating the prevalence of alliances under
technologically intense and changing circumstances is that, as an option, alliances
represent the best means of coping with daunting technological challenges (e.g.,
Auster, 1992; Badaracco, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1993; Kotabe et al., 1996; Singh, 1995).
In fact, it has been shown that incumbents that rely on internal development and
stand-alone entry in markets with high technical uncertainty face a greater likelihood
of competitive disadvantage (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Mitchell & Singh,
1992). Therefore, one can argue that technological intensity would be a powerful
motivator for ﬁrms to respond quickly to their competitors’ alliance formation
(Kotabe et al., 1996). Through an alliance the responding ﬁrm can more efﬁciently
access, integrate, and implement new technological capabilities and competencies
that might offset the advantage initially garnered by the action-taking ﬁrm’s alliance.
P3. The greater the technological intensity of the industry, the greater the
likelihood that ﬁrm B will form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance
formation.
Market life cycle. A great deal of research has been devoted to the evolution of
markets (e.g., Auster, 1992; Harrigan, 1985; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Porter, 1980).
Though labels may vary, the literature identiﬁes four common stages of market
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reveals different technological, environmental, and competitive conditions (Auster,
1992). It has been argued, both theoretically and empirically, that this evolution does
inﬂuence the frequency and pattern of cooperative agreements linked to a ﬁrm
(Auster, 1992; Cainarca, Colombo, & Mariotti, 1992; Harrigan, 1988). More
speciﬁcally, research has shown that the introduction stage of a market (Auster,
1992) or technology (Cainarca et al., 1992)—which is typically characterized by
extreme uncertainty and a need for adaptive efﬁciency—is associated with, at best, a
higher frequency of R&D agreements (Auster, 1992). As ﬁrms are competing for
ideas, product concepts, and technology choices (Prahalad, 1995) R&D agreements
may enable ﬁrms to compete while maintaining a certain degree of ﬂexibility.
As the market evolves to the early development stage and additional resources
become available (i.e., growth stage), the focus of agreements shifts from exploratory
R&D efforts to joint development agreements following the partial resolution of
uncertainty. As the market stabilizes and becomes placid (i.e., mature stage), factors
such as incremental innovations, economies of scale, and economies of scope become
more crucial, and cooperative agreements that enable participants to draw on critical
resources to exert more control and stabilize their respective competitive positions
become more popular (Auster, 1992; Beekun & Ginn, 1993; Hrebiniak & Joyce,
1985).
In the ﬁnal stage it seems inconceivable that ﬁrms would form alliances. The
declining stage is commonly an outcome of major technological shifts, social and
demographic changes, or regulatory changes that make current products and
processes obsolete (Harrigan, 1988; Porter, 1980). Under such circumstances, the
likelihood of two ﬁrms forming a cooperative relationship is minimal. However, if
one does occur it is likely to take the form of divestment or defensive collusion
agreements (Cainarca et al., 1992). According to Auster (1992), any form of activity
that might take place will involve limited technological linkages in an attempt to
revitalize the market or to delay the death of the industry.
The above discussion illuminates the emerging pattern of alliance-based
competition by suggesting that the propensity toward alliance-based competition
is greatest in the growth stage—where the incentive is high to gain rapid access to
specialized assets that complement a ﬁrm’s innovations and speed up the potential
for commercial success—and in the maturity stage—where strategies aimed at
oligopolistic rents are likely to elicit a competitive response. The propensity toward
alliance-based competition is lower in the introduction stage (due to uncertainty
regarding technology, product, market, and end-user) and lowest in the declining
stage.
3
P4. The likelihood that ﬁrm B will form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance
formation is related to the stage of a market’s life cycle. More speciﬁcally, response
3It is recognized that our argument, based primarily on prior research, may be biased toward the
expanding stages rather than the declining stage because most of the cases and data are from information
technology sectors. Hence the evidence of R&D agreements and technological exchanges.
R.M. Guidice et al. / Scand. J. Mgmt. 19 (2003) 135–152 143likelihood is greatest in the growth and maturing stages, and lower in the
introduction and declining stages.
Competitor proximity. Research on competitive analysis has argued that the
competitive proximity of ﬁrms serves as a useful window to assess the consequences
of competitive attacks and counterattacks on the focal ﬁrm (Barnett, 1993; Chen,
1996). Following Chen (1996), we deﬁne competitive proximity as the combined
degree of market commonality and resource similarity among competitors. Assessing
market commonality requires that a ﬁrm analyze not only the number of markets in
which it competes but also how many of these markets interconnect with a
competitor’s markets (Barnett, 1993; Chen, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996).
Competitors that overlap in a number of strategically important markets may be
seen as direct rivals, wherein there is a greater likelihood that there will be an in-kind
response to a competitor’s alliance action in an attempt to nullify the effect of the
alliance on the ﬁrm’s competitive position.
4
Resource commonality is deﬁned as the degree to which competitors possess
similar types and amounts of strategic and resource endowments (Chen, 1996) such
as technological know-how, experience, and internal assets. Firms with analogous
resources are likely to display similar strategic behavior, capabilities, and
competitive strengths and weaknesses (Chen, 1996). Thus, a ﬁrm is more likely to
retaliate against a competitor’s alliance action when the alliance is likely to impact its
resource proﬁle. In sum, we suggest that competitive proximity (consisting of market
commonality and resource similarity) will be an inﬂuential indicator of a ﬁrm’s
propensity to react to a rival’s alliance action.
P5. The greater the competitive proximity, the greater the likelihood that ﬁrm B
will form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance formation.
Market concentration. The structural characteristics of the competitive environ-
ment inﬂuence the behavior of ﬁrms (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Previous research
has shown that strategic alliances are most likely to be formed in an environment
characterized by moderate concentration (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976;
Rajagopalan & Yong, 1995).
In a highly concentrated market, such as a monopolistic or collusive market, a
ﬁrm has the market power necessary to obtain resources independently in order to
sustain and enhance its competitive advantage. Consequently, no incentive exists to
either initiate an alliance or respond to a competitor’s action. Moreover, an alliance
with a dominant ﬁrm is likely to be met with great antitrust opposition, thereby
further reducing the incentive to form an alliance.
In a less concentrated market, or a market leaning toward pure competition, each
ﬁrm is highly dependent on external resources but is limited in its ability to secure
these scarce resources. While alliances might initially appear to be a solution, it is
argued that lack of market power diminishes alliance attractiveness because an
alliance will probably not lead to a reduction in competition. Moreover, if one
4MasterCard’s strategic alliance with Excite was a direct and similar response to an earlier strategic
alliance between Visa and Yahoo (Alliance Analyst, September 15, 1998).
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alliance action or response.
In contrast to excessive or minimal market concentration, in a moderately
concentrated market such as an oligopolistic market, a ﬁrm can have comparable
market power in relation to its competitors. An alliance action or reaction in this
instance may be beneﬁcial if it capitalizes on both internally developed assets and
access to external resources. Thus, a competitor’s alliance action will likely be seen as
a threat requiring an immediate response.
P6. In a moderately concentrated market there is a greater likelihood that ﬁrm B
will form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance formation.
4.2. Organizational-level moderating variables
To this point we have suggested that within a population of ﬁrms we are likely to
observe similar competitive engagements and responses—under the aforementioned
antecedent conditions. In other words, given a particular context (e.g., greater
competitive proximity), all ﬁrms will display similar strategic behavior (e.g., more
likely to respond). Consequently, within the population, this implies a deterministic
rather than voluntaristic orientation toward the competitive and general environ-
ment. However, resource-based theory suggests that even within a population, ﬁrms
are often heterogeneous, possessing different resource proﬁles, competencies, and
capabilities that inﬂuence their propensity for competitive engagement and response
(Chen, 1996). Following this branch of literature, we propose that a few differences
at the individual ﬁrm level will moderate the relationship between an alliance action
and a subsequent response.
Collaborative know-how. The sheer number of alliances that have been formed
over the past decade suggests that ﬁrms are gaining experience in alliance formation.
However, experience alone does not build collaborative know-how and is not
enough to ensure a competitive advantage or to guarantee success with future
alliances (Simonin, 1997). Consistent with proponents of organizational learning
(e.g., Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988), we argue that it is
quality, not quantity, of alliance experience that is crucial. Firms must acquire and
internalize know-how from alliance experiences if they are to derive the maximum
tangible and intangible value from their alliance relationships.
5 In support of this
position Simonin (1997) found that alliance know-how mediates the relationship
between alliance experience and ﬁrm performance. Firms that internalized alliance
know-how were not only able to realize greater beneﬁts, but they were also able to
apply this knowledge to future alliances.
Further corroboration of our argument can be found in the resource-based theory
literature. This theory suggests that a sustained competitive advantage requires that
assets be valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and nonsubstitutable (e.g., Barney,
5Companies such as Federal Express, Oracle, and Hewlett-Packard have in-house databases that
systematically document, track, and monitor their alliance relationships from the idea-conception stage to
eventual termination (Alliance Analyst, 1997).
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meets this criteria to a greater extent than does alliance experience. It is often easier
to imitate a competitor’s experience than it is to imitate a competitor’s causally
ambiguous and idiosyncratic skills and abilities (Simonin, 1997).
Following this line of thought, we argue that alliance experiential knowledge will
moderate the intensity of alliance competitive engagement. Firms that not only have
alliance experience but also have internalized lessons learned from these alliances will
be more apt to respond to a competitor’s alliance action. These ﬁrms know what
alliances entail and know the potential beneﬁts that can be derived from such a
relationship. Moreover, because they have developed a multitude of alliance-based
skills and capabilities, they are better able to assess the situation and determine
whether a response would be beneﬁcial. In fact, analysis may reveal that the ﬁrm is
quite capable of successfully competing alone. Nevertheless, it is likely that the
experienced ﬁrm will have the requisite knowledge to better investigate and identify
compatible partners whose complementary skills and resources will aid in counter-
acting the gains achieved by its rival’s alliance.
P7. The greater the collaborative know-how that ﬁrm B has acquired from its
alliance experiences, the greater the likelihood that ﬁrm B will respond to ﬁrm A’s
alliance formation by forming an alliance of its own.
Firm size. Firm size has often been referred to as a critical moderating variable in
organizational theory (Kimberly, 1976) thereby inﬂuencing the types of strategies
that are needed to compete effectively (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). We argue that
relatively smaller and larger organizations are less likely to respond to a competitor’s
alliance action than relatively medium-sized ﬁrms.
6 Smaller organizations often lack
the necessary slack resources (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991) to pursue an
alliance, or are not inﬂuential enough to secure partners with which to form an
alliance agreement (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). In addition, smaller ﬁrms often focus on
market niches, thus reducing the type of strategic capabilities that they can obtain
from alliances (Burgers et al., 1993). Large ﬁrms in turn, though more likely to
possess the necessary slack resources, are often structurally complex and bureau-
cratic as well as inhibited by structural inertia (Hannah & Freeman, 1989), all of
which limits their ability to respond. Further, due to the advantages of economies of
scale and market power, large ﬁrms have less need to form a partnership with others
possessing the same or fewer attributes. Large ﬁrms have the ability to combat their
competitor’s alliance action on their own.
In contrast, medium-sized ﬁrms face considerable competition, since a strategic
action is likely to disrupt the ﬁrm’s market share to some extent. Because the ﬁrm is
neither large nor small, it does not possess the same advantages as small ﬁrms (e.g.,
focus strategy) or large ﬁrms (e.g., market power). Though the ﬁrm cannot capitalize
on advantages of large or small size ﬁrms, it will be exposed to similar disadvantages,
such as fewer slack resources, increased complexity, and slower information
6We have distinguished between relative and absolute size because what size means to ﬁrms in different
industries may vary. Our argument is meant to apply to numerous industries and this distinction makes
such analysis feasible.
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Thus, we argue that a medium-sized ﬁrm is more likely to respond to a competitor’s
alliance formation.
P8. The likelihood of ﬁrm B forming an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance
formation will be a function of its size. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm B is more likely to form an
alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance action if ﬁrm B is of relatively medium size.
Firm strategy. In examining the usage of cooperative linkages in relation to the
external environment, Beekun and Ginn (1993) argue that ﬁrms will adjust their
cooperative linkages to better align themselves with a changing environment.
However, they also suggest that various strategies will have different focuses that, in
turn, affect which environmental factors they attend to. For instance, the prospector
in Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology is said to have an external focus, proactively
scanning the environment for opportunities and threats relative to the analyzer,
defender, and reactor. Characteristics such as this suggest that the prospector might
be more responsive to a competitor’s alliance formation than perhaps a defender,
who is often characterized as internally focused, taking a passive attitude toward
external events (Beekun & Ginn, 1993).
A ﬁrm’s strategic proﬁle will also be inﬂuenced by its choice of reference point
(Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996) because a ﬁrm’s reference point will affect
which environmental factors it emphasizes. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm with a focus on
targets internal to the organization (e.g., production efﬁciency or quality
improvement) might not attend to many environmental changes. And if it does, it
will perceive those changes differently from a ﬁrm with an external reference point
(e.g., competitor’s actions). It is suggested that the ﬁrm with an external focus will be
more likely to perceive the competitor’s move as an important event that requires a
response.
P9. The likelihood of ﬁrm B forming an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance
formation will be inﬂuenced by its choice of strategy and strategic proﬁle.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm B is likely to form an alliance in response to ﬁrm A’s alliance
action if its strategic behavior is more externally than internally focused.
5. Discussion and conclusions
It has been argued that a new form of competition is emerging—alliance versus
alliance—in an effort to create, build, and sustain a competitive advantage. In
building a theoretical context to gain a better understanding of the antecedent
conditions of alliance-based competition, this paper recognizes cooperation among
ﬁrms as a strategy that enables ﬁrms to inﬂuence not only their respective
competitive positions as members of the alliance (Hamel, 1991; Parkhe, 1993) but
also the competitive position of their ‘‘competitive alliance others’’ in an attempt to
generate a sustained competitive advantage. Such a perspective is hemmed in by the
principles of the competitive paradigm and its applications for conducting a
‘‘cooperative’’ competitive analysis.
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proliferate, a more thorough understanding of a rapidly emerging mode of
competition—namely, alliance-based competition—is in order. Gomes-Casseres
(1996) and Doz and Hamel (1998) were among the ﬁrst to have explored the
increasing frequency of collaboration as a reﬂection of a fundamental shift from the
traditional form of competition (ﬁrm versus ﬁrm) to a new form (group versus
group). By laying the foundation for this unexplored yet critical ﬁeld of inquiry,
these researchers have provided a basis for investigating the underlying principles of
alliance competition. Building on this research, the present paper develops a
conceptual model that speciﬁcally investigates the interaction between an alliance
action and the alliance response that it induces. The scope of this article is limited to
addressing issues germane to the antecedent conditions that lead to the emergence of
alliance-based competition and inter-alliance rivalry. Scholars and practitioners alike
should derive beneﬁt from an enhanced understanding of how the use of alliances as
a competitive tool may not always result in the performance outcome expected if in-
kind retaliation negates the strategy’s effectiveness and sustainability.
In particular, the model posits that market characteristics (competitive un-
certainty, number of value-generating partners, technological intensity, industry
growth, competitive proximity, and market concentration) play a central role in
determining the likelihood of a competitive alliance response to an alliance action.
That is, pair-wise competitor analysis of market attributes leads to structural tension
that is temporarily addressed (i.e., competitive position defended) as the focal ﬁrm
responds to its competitor’s alliance action by forming an alliance of its own. Given
the asymmetrical nature of ﬁrm strategy, structure, and performance and the
resulting heterogeneity it spawns in the market, it has been further argued that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc attributes (collaborative know-how, ﬁrm size, and ﬁrm strategy) moderate
the relationship between context and likelihood of alliance response. However, once
an alliance reaction occurs alliance rivalry exists since any further competitive
interaction, decisions, and battles will occur at a new level—group versus group
rather than ﬁrm versus ﬁrm.
5.1. Research implications
The most obvious and major research implication stems from the development of
the alliance-based competition concept using the action/response dichotomy of
competitive analysis. By bridging the literature on alliances and the literature on
competitive analysis, this paper conceptualizes competition as between alliances and
examines the precursive competitive relationship as one that involves a competitive
move (alliance action) and a competitive countermove (alliance response).
From this basis, progress can be made toward empirically based research on the
explanatory power of this model. To this end the initial challenge will be to
operationalize and measure the constructs in our proposed framework. For initial
inquiries it may be useful to examine and perhaps adapt measures used in previous
studies that have looked at some of our variables, but in different contexts. For
example, Chen (1996) proposed using a type-by-type comparison of resources and
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market commonality. There also exists a number of studies that have investigated
technological intensity and market life cycle in various contexts. Variables that have
the potential to be more difﬁcult to operationalize include alliance know-how and
ﬁrm strategy (i.e, strategic proﬁle/reference point). This information will typically
not be found in secondary sources and it will be necessary to develop measures that
capture the construct appropriately.
Empirical progress should also be made on the use of alliances as competitive
weapons to establish and sustain advantages such as better cost structures, improved
quality, improved margins, better speed in manufacturing and distribution,
enhanced core competencies, and more extensive markets for products both within
and across industries, to name a few. It would be reasonable to assume, in this age of
alliance-based competition, that the potential to sustain an alliance-based advantage
would be a function of the competitive strength of the alliance (e.g., ﬁnancial strength
of partners, competitive positions of partners, and combined alliance experience of
partners), the competitive elements of the alliance (e.g., combined degree of strategic
and tactical elements in the alliance), and the competitive impact of the alliance (e.g.,
number and intensity of competitive responses and barriers to imitation). In this
context, the mutual forbearance hypothesis needs to be revisited. Multi-point
competition involving two single ﬁrms may have very different implications for
mutual forbearance compared with two alliances, where the very notion that a
combined entity is better than a single entity may cause strategic and tactical
behaviors that reduce the degree of mutual forbearance and intensify multi-point
competition.
We recommend a research program that will help illuminate and improve our
understanding of competition from an alliance perspective. Research should seek to
address the underlying premise that the antecedents posited to impact alliance action
and alliance response, do indeed facilitate alliance competition. For instance,
researchers have to exercise care in determining exactly that the alliance response
was actually a competitive reply to an alliance action, rather than coincidental action
that accidentally developed competitive implications. Firm B could have formed an
alliance in response to other existing conditions in the environment, independent of
the alliance formed by ﬁrm A, and the competitive response might not have been
intended as a strategic move.
An equally important element in the research agenda would be to investigate those
components of an alliance action that are unchallenged or responded to in a delayed
manner. By shedding light on this through rigorous theoretical development and
empirical validation, any advantages from a strategic alliance perspective that are
bestowed on the ﬁrst movers, early entrants, and late entrants can be better
understood. Furthermore, this research would help to illuminate the intensity of a
competitive move (alliance action) and the resulting intensity and speed of a
competitive countermove (alliance response).
The variables offered are by no means meant to be exhaustive. Rather, the aim
was to propose a framework for conceptualizing alliance competition and inter-
alliance rivalry and to begin the process of integrating research in strategic alliances
R.M. Guidice et al. / Scand. J. Mgmt. 19 (2003) 135–152 149and competitive analysis. It is hoped that as research progresses, the general model
presented above will give rise to a more detailed and developed theory of alliance-
based collective competition.
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